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Review
RIVER RAMS
Union rams and amphibious assault units were 'useless' and 'costly'
Symonds, Craig L.
Summer 2000
Hearn, Chester G. Ellet's Brigade: The Strangest Outfit of All. Louisiana State
University Press, 2000-05-01. ISBN 807125598
Chester G. Hearn is a prolific writer who has published an astonishing eight
books in the past five years. Most of these concern naval aspects of the Civil
War, and five of them, including this one, deal with the war on the Mississippi.
Ellet's Brigade is the history of a curious - even bizarre - command that Hearn
in his subtitle describes as "the strangest outfit of all."
The command of Charles Ellet, Jr., was not really a "brigade" at all except in
name. It began in 1861 when Ellet, a 51-year-old engineer and bridge builder,
tried to convince Navy Secretary Gideon Welles that a squadron of fast, unarmed
river steamers, used as rams, could defeat conventional river warships. Welles
was skeptical of both the idea and its progenitor, and rejected the proposal. But
Ellet found a more receptive audience in Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton,
who gave the eager but militarily inexperienced Ellet his chance.
Ellet purchased four side-wheel steamers (adding more later), reinforced
their prows with heavy timbers, and took them to war, choosing several of his
relatives as officers. Because his small squadron did not fit into the command
structure of either the army or the navy, Ellet was practically his own master and
virtually able to do whatever he wanted. Despite his command of warships, he
bore the rank of colonel, though most of the time he disdained any uniform and
wore civilian clothes on the bridge. His initial conception of a proper tactical
doctrine for his rams was that they should smash themselves sacrificially into
enemy gunboats on what amounted to suicide missions. Understandably, both
the navy high command and many of those Ellet sought to recruit looked upon
this whole enterprise with considerable skepticism.
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Nevertheless, at the Battle of Memphis in June 1862, Ellet's unusual and
aggressive tactics appeared to be justified when he charged past the U.S. Navy
gunboats of Union Flag Officer Charles Henry Davis and into the midst of the
enemy squadron, sinking the two largest Confederate gunboats and damaging
others. Ellet received a leg wound in that battle and subsequently died of blood
poisoning. Control of the ram fleet then devolved onto his brother Alfred, who
was in command of the Queen of the West when it rammed the Confederate
ironclad Arkansas under the guns of Vicksburg in July 1862. (Though William
"Dirty Bill" Porter later claimed credit for the destruction of that vessel, Hearn
argues that the critical blow was struck by the Queen of the West when, in the
initial collision, it damaged the Arkansas's connecting rods, the subsequent
failure of which forced the Rebels to abandon and destroy the vessel
themselves.)
When David Dixon Porter took command of the Mississippi River Squadron
that fall, Lincoln placed the ram fleet under the senior Porter's control. As
compensation, Alfred Ellet was promoted to brigadier general, and saw to it that
his teenage nephew Charlie became a colonel. Charlie took over command of the
ram fleet while Alfred busied himself organizing a force dubbed the "Marine
Brigade." The idea here was similar to current doctrine in the U.S. Marine Corps:
an amphibious assault unit continuously embarked and therefore ready to
descend at a moment's notice on an enemy position. Today this is called a
Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU); Alfred Ellet called his command the
"Mississippi Marine Brigade."
Alas, from this point on, the story loses some of its cohesiveness. Charlie
Ellet's rams participated in a number of expeditions up the Yazoo and Red
Rivers as well as on the Mississippi, but they did so as part of larger expeditions.
The young colonel attempted to duplicate his uncle's feat by ramming the
Confederate gunboat City of Vicksburg below the city, then incautiously
ventured up the Red River where he ran his vessel aground and had to abandon
it. That was pretty much the last independent action by the ram fleet, for Porter
viewed Ellet's command not as a distinctive unit, but as a useful group of
auxiliary vessels best used for transport or scouting.
In the latter half of the book, Hearn focuses increasingly on Alfred Ellet's
Marine Brigade, which, like the ram fleet, tended to act independently. If
19-year-old Charlie was young and irresponsible, his uncle Alfred Ellet emerges
in this narrative as unskilled and unreliable, even cowardly. He had trouble from
2
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol2/iss3/23
the outset. Recruiting was difficult because service in his unaffiliated command
did not count against the state quotas in the conscription bills. As a result, he had
to make promises to his recruits that he could not keep: no marching, clean beds,
hot meals, etc. Once organized, his command of just under 1,200 men spent most
of a year rampaging up and down the Mississippi, achieving little besides
infuriating the locals, stealing cotton, and often running away at any sign of
serious resistance.
The value of Hearn's coverage of these events is that it reminds us that the
Civil War did not consist of a number of famous set-piece battles with long
uneventful periods in between. Along the Mississippi, as elsewhere, it was a
constant war of skirmishes and ambushes. In that war, Ellet's Brigade
contributed little. The conclusion of Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana
was that Ellet's Brigade was "a very useless as well as costly institution," and a
contemporary newspaper reported, all too accurately, that Ellet's men "were
generally where they were not wanted and seldom at hand when needed."
The story of the creation and demise of this curious command offers insight
into the ad hoc nature of the Union mobilization in the early years of the War. It
was created in the first place due to the aggressive politicking of Charles Ellet,
and subsequently sustained largely out of inertia. Hearn is a good storyteller,
though the second half of the book lacks the narrative unity of the first. One
other problem with the book is that its maps are all reprints of earlier, public
domain sources and often do not include sites that are named in the text.
Nevertheless, Hearn's many recent contributions, including Ellet's Brigade,
successfully re-focus attention on the many-faceted naval side of the Civil War,
including the conflict on the western rivers.
Craig L. Symonds is professor of history at the United States Naval
Academy and the author of eight books on military and naval history including,
most recently, Confederate Admiral: The Life and Wars of Franklin Buchanan
(1999).
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